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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection process identifies 
deficiencies related to how firms conduct audits. Our work extends prior research by examining 
the type of internal control audit deficiencies (entity-level or application-level).  Internal control 
audit deficiencies of both types may increase the risk of material misstatement, so the PCAOB is 
concerned with whether audit firms are performing appropriate procedures to identify entity-
level and application-level internal control audit deficiencies, including those involving 
information technology general controls (ITGCs). Using text analysis to examine audit 
deficiencies by internal control type and firm size, we find that PCAOB inspection reports 
identify significantly more application-level than entity-level control audit deficiencies. 
Application-level control deficiencies generally involve revenue, inventory, and accounts 
receivable accounts whereas entity-level deficiencies often involve lack of centralized controls 
or controls over period end financial reporting. The number of application-level deficiencies 
identified for both Big 4 and second-tier firms varied between inspection years 2010 and 2015. 
However, the number of entity-level deficiencies, including ITGCs for both Big 4 and second-tier 
firms, held nearly steady during the period. Our findings should be of interest to practicing 
accountants, regulators, and other users of PCAOB inspection reports. 
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PCAOB inspections: An analysis of entity-level and application-level control audit deficiencies 
 
Audit and national office professionals must appropriately address known deficiencies in their 
auditing of high-risk areas, and auditors must have the fortitude to refuse to sign off on an audit 
if important issues remain unresolved (SEC, 2016).  




The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), sections 302 and 404, requires that U.S. publicly traded 
companies implement, maintain, and test a system of internal controls to reduce the 
probability of material financial statement misstatement, and it mandates that auditors must 
evaluate these internal controls. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
inspection process identifies deficiencies in how firms conduct audits, including those 
deficiencies related to internal controls. Recently, researchers have begun to analyze PCAOB 
inspection reports to understand these audit deficiencies (Church and Shefchik, 2012; Nagy, 
2014). Audit deficiencies are defined as issues for which sufficient, competent evidential matter 
does not appear to have been collected in support of the audit opinion on the issuer’s financial 
statement (PCAOB, 2008, 7).1 Research examining PCAOB inspection reports suggests that (1) 
audit deficiencies appear to be decreasing, at least among those firms auditing more than 100 
issuers annually (Church and Shefchik, 2012); that (2) audit deficiencies involve all areas of the 
audit process: planning, testing, and reporting (Hogan et al., 2008); that (3) audit deficiencies 
involve both account balances and internal controls (Hogan et al., 2008); that (4) auditors may 
increase their audit effort when they expect their work will be inspected by the PCAOB 
                                                          
1 Similar to most prior research (Acito et al., 2017; Church and Shefchik, 2012; Drake et al., 2016; Nagy, 2014), this 
study examines publicly available PCAOB inspection report Part II findings. In contrast, Aobdia and coauthors use a 
proprietary database to explore how PCAOB Part I findings, which are not available to the public, impact audit 
quality (Aobdia, 2016a; Aobdia, 2016b; Aobdia, 2016c; Aobdia et al., 2016). 
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(Stefaniak et al., 2017); that (5) clients use PCAOB inspection reports as a proxy for auditor 
quality and undertake personnel changes based on the timing and extent of cited deficiencies 
(Abbott et al., 2013; Nagy, 2014; Robertson et al., 2014); and that (6) fair value audit 
deficiencies may reduce the information uncertainty of complex estimates (Dee et al., 2017).  
PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies may include those related either to accounts or to 
internal controls, and they may involve technology issues such as information technology 
general controls (ITGCs) (Hogan et al., 2008). Internal controls are usually categorized as either 
entity-level or application-level, and these are the two types we analyze in this study. Entity-
level controls (sometimes referred to as “general controls” in textbooks [e.g., Romney and 
Steinbart, 2018]) are meant to oversee the internal control environment (Dickins and Fay, 2017; 
Kinney et al., 2013). ITGCs are entity-level controls specifically involving information processed 
and stored electronically (Singleton, 2013). Deficiencies from entity-level control failure may 
affect the internal control environment and ultimately the quality of financial statements 
(Church and Shefchik, 2012). By contrast, application-level controls (also known as “transaction-
level controls”) govern a specific account or subset of accounts and regulate access to and 
processing of account transactions (Romney and Steinbart, 2018). Deficiencies resulting from 
application-level controls not operating properly may introduce erroneous and/or fraudulent 
transactions into the system, but such risks generally do not affect all transactions or the 
system as a whole (PCAOB, 2007a). However, multiple application-level control deficiencies for 
one issuer may suggest that this issuer has poor entity-level controls, and thus the auditor 
should look for causal ITGC weaknesses and/or deficient auditing of ITGCs.  
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While initial research on PCAOB inspections has identified deficiencies and categorized 
them by account and frequency (Church and Shefchik, 2012; Landis et al., 2011), the type of 
internal control deficiencies in general and entity-level deficiencies in particular, including those 
involving ITGCs, has not been examined extensively,2 despite the fact that entity-level internal 
control deficiencies often result in financial statement misstatements (Church and Shefchik, 
2012) and that performance issues must be identified before audit firms can develop better 
audit procedures to address these concerns (Bonner, 1999). In addition, Big 4 and second-tier 
firms may have different issuer-client portfolios and access to different resources (Church and 
Shefchik, 2012). Depending on their size, firms may use different procedures to examine 
internal controls, which could ultimately affect the audit outcome (Janvrin et al., 2009). Thus, 
we compare the type of control audit deficiencies between Big 4 and second-tier firms. 
Specifically, we examine whether control deficiency trends changed over time in response to 
(1) recent efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the PCAOB to 
emphasize the need for audit firms to obtain sufficient evidence to support their internal 
control opinion (DeFond and Lennox, 2017) and (2) the adoption of Auditing Standard No. 13, 
which stresses the importance of entity-level controls during risk assessment (Gerkes et al., 
2007; PCAOB, 2012).  
Using text analysis as our method of inquiry, we focus on the type of internal control 
deficiencies, including those involving ITGCs, by examining PCAOB reports for control 
                                                          
2 Church and Shefchik (2012) discuss internal control reporting in PCAOB inspection reports as a “secondary issue.” 
DeFond and Lennox (2017) classify internal control deficiencies into two broad content categories: (1) control 
processing, which includes inadequate tests of internal controls that may potentially result in a failure to detect 
the existence of a material weakness, and (2) control reporting, which includes inappropriate evaluation of the 
materiality of a detected weakness that may potentially result in a failure to report a material weakness. 
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infractions by Big 4 and second-tier U.S. firms from inspection years 2010 to 2015. We have 
four reasons for our study design. First, internal control audit deficiencies are emerging as 
specific, separate, reportable events from a PCAOB standpoint, as evidenced by the issuance of 
Auditing Standard No. 13 (PCAOB, 2010) and other PCAOB communication (DeFond and 
Lennox, 2017; PCAOB, 2017a, 2017b). Second, prior research examining the content of 
inspection reports focused on account-level audit deficiencies and treated internal control audit 
deficiencies as “secondary” (Church and Shefchik, 2012) or classified them as affecting either 
internal control processing or internal control reporting (DeFond and Lennox, 2017). We believe 
that internal control audit deficiencies warrant further examination given that such deficiencies 
are critical to audits of both financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting 
whose failure may result in misstatement (Kinney et al., 2013). Third, internal control 
deficiencies, particularly ITGCs, often impact clients’ IT systems, which are increasingly 
important as clients adopt newer technologies (Klamm and Watson, 2009; PCAOB, 2017a; 
Wallace et al., 2011). Fourth and finally, Church and Shefchik (2012) found that the number of 
control audit deficiencies decreased for inspection years 2004 to 2007 and then increased in 
inspection year 2009. We compare inspection reports across a more recent six-year horizon—
inspection years 2010 to 2015 (issued in years 2011 to 2016)—to examine whether this trend 
has continued in light of the recent changes to the auditing environment discussed above. 
Our results indicate that the PCAOB identified significantly more application-level 
control than entity-level control deficiencies for inspection years 2010 to 2015. The most 
commonly cited application-level control deficiencies involved the accounts of revenue, 
inventory, and accounts receivable, whereas the most common entity-level deficiencies 
5 
 
involved a lack of centralized processing controls, including those related to shared service 
environments and period-end financial reporting process controls. Furthermore, 35% of all Big 
4 issuers examined by the PCAOB had deficiencies, and 17% of those were control deficiencies. 
For second-tier issuers, 45% had deficiencies, and 16% of those involved control deficiencies. 
The proportion of all control deficiencies classified as application-level or entity-level 
deficiencies varied by firm size. For Big 4 firms, 75% of all control audit deficiencies were 
application-level, whereas for second-tier firms only 66% of all control deficiencies were 
application-level, with the remaining 34% involving entity-level deficiencies. Longitudinally, the 
number of application-level internal control deficiencies identified for both Big 4 and second-
tier firms varied from inspection year 2010 to inspection year 2015. However, the number of 
entity-level internal control audit deficiencies including ITGCs remained relatively steady 
through the period for both Big 4 and second-tier firms.  
Our study is important because audit deficiencies have implications for practicing 
accountants, regulators, audit committee members, and users of inspection reports (Church 
and Shefchik, 2012; DeFond and Lennox, 2017; Persellin, 2013; Calderon et al., 2016), and few 
prior studies have examined the type of internal control audit deficiencies (Eutsler, 2017). In 
addition, our findings inform both researchers and practitioners on the state of PCAOB internal 
control reporting by addressing what Hogan et al. (2008) characterized as a paucity of research 
on internal control deficiencies, specifically entity-level deficiencies. For example, our results 
indicating that the number of application-level and entity-level internal control deficiencies did 
not decrease between inspection years 2010 and 2015 may be ascribed to one of several 
factors that would require follow-up research to determine the likely cause.  
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 The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the PCAOB inspection 
process, reviews relevant literature on internal control systems, and presents our research 
questions. The third section describes the methodology we used to assess PCAOB inspection 
reports. The fourth reports our results, and the fifth section offers conclusions and suggestions 
for future research. 
2. Background and research questions 
 
2.1 PCAOB inspections 
At the heart of SOX (2002) is the mandate for all U.S. public companies to implement, 
maintain, and test a system of internal control that is effective in the prevention and/or 
detection of material financial statement misstatement (sections 302 and 404). Key to SOX is 
the creation of the PCAOB (section 104), whose role includes inspecting audit firms’ 
performance regarding audits of public companies. The PCAOB inspects registered U.S. firms 
auditing more than 100 issuers annually and firms that regularly audit 100 or fewer issuers at 
least triennially. Following each inspection, the PCAOB issues a report that details the audit 
deficiencies identified (Boone et al., 2015, 2017). These deficiencies are not released to the 
general public until after the audit firm has been given 12 months to address the issues (Drake 
et al., 2016). Similar to prior research (Church and Shefchik, 2012; DeFond and Lennox, 2017; 
Drake et al., 2016; Nagy, 2014), we examine the Part II deficiencies that the PCAOB has made 
public.  
The PCAOB (2012) defines deficiencies as those situations where the auditor has failed 
to gather sufficient evidence to support the opinion that the financial statements are fairly 
stated or the opinion that the company’s internal control is effective. This study concentrates 
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on deficiencies related to internal controls. An effective internal control system, aside from its 
mandate in SOX, extends beyond the mere detection/prevention of fraud. Prior research 
documents that effective internal controls affect bond ratings, credit risk, and analysts’ 
estimates of company performance (Bell and Carcello, 2000; Elbannan, 2008), as well as cash 
flows, profit, and accrual quality (Doyle et al., 2007).  
2.2 Type of control audit deficiencies  
While SOX prescribes the necessity of having internal control to prevent material 
misstatements, it refers readers to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) framework for identifying control activities (COSO, 1992; Klamm and 
Watson, 2009).3 This framework, expanded in 2013 to reflect the integration of accounting and 
business systems, does not expressly identify controls by type (e.g., entity versus application) 
(COSO, 1992, 2013).4 While the PCAOB (2007a) identifies pervasive, general controls governing 
access to an organization's resources as "entity-level," there are differing terms for controls at 
the process or transaction level. Reviewing the literature and instructional materials (e.g., 
Romney and Steinbart, 2018), we adopt the term "application-level" control to represent those 
controls that oversee transaction processing. As such, the dichotomy we adopt to classify 
control audit deficiencies recognizes "entity-level" and "application-level" as two distinct types 
of controls.  
                                                          
3 COSO’s Internal Control—Integrated Framework was originally published in 1992. The majority of U.S. publicly 
traded companies have adopted the 1992 framework (updated in 2013) to assess and report on the design and 
operating effectiveness of their internal controls annually. 
4 In discussing the five components that make up the framework, COSO (1992, 2013) indicates that the “internal 
control environment” is an example of an entity-level control. However, the other components are not classified as 
entity-level or application-level controls. 
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To guide practitioners on the type of internal control, the PCAOB (2007a) issued a 
position paper proposing that internal control be understood as a “pyramid” consisting of five 
levels or strata, with entity-level controls at the top and application-level controls at the base. 
Essentially, the difference in the type of internal control is scope. While material misstatement 
can occur because internal controls are lacking, entity-level controls are more pervasive, as 
they affect the execution of other controls and have a direct impact on functions such as the 
financial close process and the generation of financial statements (PCAOB, 2007b). Auditing 
Standard No. 5 classifies entity-level controls into several categories including monitoring 
management override of controls and central processing controls (PCAOB, 2007a). The financial 
close process presents entity-level risks to the firm because of its complexity. This complexity, 
defined as the number and type of processes involved (AICPA, 2002), introduces uncertainty 
into auditors’ risk assessment (Asare et al., 2013), and uncertainty may lead to a failure to 
identify internal control deficiencies and/or to an inaccurate assessment of their impact on the 
financial statements, potentially resulting in material misstatements going undetected (AICPA, 
2002). In sum, the failure of entity-level controls impacts the entire internal control 
environment. For example, the lack of entity-level controls was a factor in the WorldCom audit 
failure because unauthorized individuals were permitted to process fraudulent journal entries 
in the absence of access controls (Hogan et al., 2008). When auditors discover entity-level 
control failures, additional testing is needed. We examine not only entity-level control 
deficiencies collectively but also categorize these control deficiencies according to Auditing 
Standard No. 5 classification.  
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By contrast, application-level controls (also known as “transaction-level controls”) 
govern a specific account or subset of accounts, regulate access to and processing of 
transactions, and are often unique to a particular account or group of accounts (Romney and 
Steinbart, 2018). Application-level controls may affect one or more financial statement 
accounts (PCAOB, 2007a). For example, failure to examine how clients estimate bad debt 
expense impacts the related accounts receivable and its allowance for bad debt account. The 
failure of an application-level control to operate properly has the potential to introduce 
erroneous and/or fraudulent transactions into the system, but such risks may not affect all 
transactions or the system as a whole (PCAOB, 2007a). However, application-level control 
deficiencies may result in financial statement misstatement if multiple application-level 
controls are identified for a specific issuer and/or the accounts in question materially affect the 
financial statements. So we examine the PCAOB inspection reports to identify which accounts 
are affected by the application-level control deficiencies disclosed in the reports. Our first 
research question examines the type of control audit deficiencies reported by the PCAOB:  
RQ1:  What types of control audit deficiencies (entity-level or application-level) are 
identified by the PCAOB?  
 
2.3 Impact of firm size on type of control audit deficiencies  
Control audit deficiencies identified by the PCAOB may vary by firm size. For example, 
Big 4 audit firms are more likely than second-tier firms to have the resources needed to adopt 
and use IT-related audit procedures (Janvrin et al., 2009; Lowe et al., 2018). Further, Big 4 audit 
firms have clients that are more likely to have complex IT, necessitating that these firms make 
significant investments in their own IT to audit such clients efficiently and effectively (Bills et al., 
10 
 
2016; Keune et al., 2016). Church and Shefchik (2012) argue that smaller audit firms may be 
unable to tolerate the exposure associated with risky clients and thus encounter less complex 
auditing issues. Furthermore, given that risky clients often have highly complex IT, smaller audit 
firms are less likely to have clients with complex IT. Finally, even if smaller audit firms have 
clients with complex IT, they often do not have sufficient resources to adopt significant IT to 
examine these clients properly (Curtis and Payne, 2008; Rosli et al., 2012). This creates a 
potential economic stratification dividing firms of different sizes, with implications for audit 
efficiency and effectiveness (Janvrin et al., 2008 Gerakos and Syverson, 2015). Thus, we 
examine whether the type of control audit deficiencies varies by firm size with the following 
research question:  
RQ2:  Do the types of control audit deficiencies identified vary by firm size?  
2.4 Impact of time on type of control audit deficiencies  
The type of internal control deficiencies identified by the PCAOB may differ over time. 
For example, DeFond and Lennox (2017, 2) postulate that a decline in the frequency of adverse 
internal control opinions from 2005 to 2009 prompted the SEC to suggest that auditors may be 
failing to identify and report material internal control deficiencies. As a secondary analysis, 
Church and Shefchik (2012) examined internal control deficiencies for inspection years 2004 to 
2009 for both Big 4 and second-tier firms. They found that internal control deficiencies 
decreased for inspection years 2004 to 2007 and then increased by inspection year 2009. In 
addition, the PCAOB explicitly directed that its inspectors assess whether auditors were 
obtaining appropriate evidence to support their internal control opinions and to identify any 
deficiencies in this process (DeFond and Lennox, 2017; Franzel, 2014). Finally, Auditing 
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Standard No. 13 (PCAOB, 2010) highlights the importance of internal controls when evaluating 
the risk of a material misstatement. Specifically, Auditing Standard No. 13 requires that auditors 
assess the control environment for each assertion being tested, paying particular attention to 
data processed electronically (PCAOB, 2010, paragraphs 16–18).5 It is uncertain though whether 
auditors have responded to these changes and/or the PCAOB has concentrated its inspection 
efforts on examining how auditors review an issuer’s internal control systems. Thus, we 
examine the type of control audit deficiencies identified over time as our third research 
question:  




This study investigates PCAOB reports for inspection years 2010–2015. These reports 
were publicly issued between 2011 and 2016.6 We examine reports for the eight largest audit 
firms based on U.S. revenue that are inspected annually and categorize the firms into two 
groups: Big 4 and second-tier firms.7 Inspection reports for the following firms were reviewed: 
                                                          
5 As noted above, AS No. 13 is focused on the procedures for identifying application-level deficiencies and the 
circumstances where additional testing for risk assessment is required.  In contrast, AS No. 5 establishes the 
framework for internal controls over financial reporting audits including detailed definitions regarding the 
components of internal control and the levels of control deficiencies that may result in adverse opinions. 
 
6 A complete list of PCAOB reports issued is available on the inspection page of the PCAOB’s website: 
https://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Pages/default.aspx. 
 
7 While the PCAOB also inspects foreign firms that provide audit reports for U.S. issuers (Krishnan 
 et al., 2017), we focus on U.S. firms. Following prior research including Hogan and Martin (2009) and Aobdia 
(2016a), we define “second-tier” audit firms to include Grant Thornton, BDO, Crowe Horwath, and RSM. We 
acknowledge that during inspection years 2010 to 2015, the PCAOB also inspected Malone Bailey annually (PCAOB, 
2017a). We analyzed their inspection reports and found six application-level control deficiencies and no entity-
level deficiencies. We elected not to include Malone Bailey results in our data collection, as the firm was not 
included among second-tier firms by Hogan and Martin (2009) or Aobdia (2016a). 
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the Big 4—PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Ernst & Young (EY), Deloitte, and KPMG; and second 
tier—Grant Thornton, RSM,8 BDO, and Crowe Horwath. We downloaded the inspection reports 
for all the firms and analyzed each report separately. Our population consisted of 16 inspection 
reports for the Big 4 firms and 16 reports for the second-tier firms.  
We then used text analysis to identify internal control deficiencies in general, distinguish 
between application-level and entity-level control deficiencies, classify entity-level control 
deficiencies into Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB, 2007a) categories, and identify accounts 
associated with application-level control deficiencies. To begin, each inspection report was 
imported into NVivo, a content analysis software program validated by prior research (Siccama 
and Penna, 2008) and used in other recent research studies (Bills et al., 2016). NVivo offers 
users several tools, such as word frequency count, word context analysis, and word cloud 
diagramming that depicts potential associations among terms to assist researchers in 
identifying patterns and trends in the content. We followed an iterative stepwise procedure in 
carrying out our text analysis, the steps of which are diagrammed and described in Exhibit 1. 
Following prior research advice (Fisher et al., 2010; Li, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2016; 
Zhang et al., 2017), we performed a manual review of the output of the software program at 
each step in the text analysis process. 
[Insert Exhibit 1 about here.] 
                                                          
8 On October 26, 2015, McGladrey LLP changed its name to RSM US. We refer to this firm as RSM in our study, 
although its official company name on the early PCAOB inspection reports examined was McGladrey LLP. 
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We initially used NVivo’s word cloud feature to identify terms associated with internal 
control. A word cloud displays the frequency of all words found in a text by producing a diagram 
of the most common words, sized according to their frequency of appearance (Figure 1). We 
used this feature to identify the text passages associated with internal control. In addition, we 
examined the word cloud for additional words closely associated with internal control and 
performed text search queries and generated word clouds for these words as well. Figure 2 
displays the text search results in a word tree for internal control in Panel A and entity-level in 
Panel B. Each text passage identified was then manually reviewed to determine whether the 
passage actually discussed an internal control deficiency or not.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.] 
Next, we analyzed each internal control deficiency identified to determine whether it 
should be classified as entity-level or application-level by examining word clouds using the 
terms entity and application. We followed up with additional word clouds using words directly 
associated with these terms as identified in the initial word cloud. These directed word 
searches for entity controls included the following terms: manual journal entries, financial 
close, program change controls, ITGC, access controls, and general controls. We then examined 
each text passage containing the keyword and initially classified the passage as belonging to 
entity-level or application-level control deficiency. Our initial classification of passages by these 
two types was dichotomous and mutually exclusive. 
We identified entity-level control deficiencies based on three criteria. First, if the 
inspection report identified the deficiency as an entity-level control, we included it. The other 
14 
 
two criteria were not as straightforward. The second criterion classified deficiencies identified 
as "general controls" as entity-level, given the pervasive top-down nature of general controls 
that some authors define as entity-level controls (Romney and Steinbart, 2019). We also used 
word searches for access, manual journal entry, journal entry, software changes, unauthorized 
access, and board of directors.  
The final criterion for entity-level control deficiencies involved judgment. If a passage 
contained content describing a deficiency having a pervasive effect on the organization, or if 
the deficiency had a direct effect on multiple major accounts or otherwise indicated that the 
deficiency affected the whole organization, we classified the deficiency as an entity-level 
control. We separately identified any entity-level deficiencies that the inspection report cited as 
"information technology general controls" or "ITGC" given that many issuers today employ 
highly complex computerized financial reporting systems.  
For application-level control deficiencies, we identified the common accounts 
mentioned under application-level deficiencies from our initial word cloud. NVivo results 
indicated that the accounts of accounts receivable, revenue, inventory, allowance for loan loss, 
PP&E, and goodwill impairment had the most common application-level internal control 
deficiencies. Again, we examined the text associated with each mention of these account 
deficiencies and categorized the internal control issue according to the account categorization 
scheme, as explained below.  
Once we believed we had captured all salient data, we recorded the entity-level and 
application-level deficiencies in a spreadsheet, noting the issuer, page number where the text 
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appeared, and text passage from the PCAOB inspection document. A graduate assistant who 
was not aware of the purpose of the study then reviewed each internal control deficiency to 
confirm the accuracy of our coding. After making our initial dichotomous classification of 
deficiencies as either entity-level or application-level, we proceeded to categorize the 
deficiencies within each type for a more granular breakdown conducive to statistical 
comparisons. 
To examine more finely the entity-level control deficiencies identified, we categorized 
each entity-level control as suggested by paragraph 24 of Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB, 
2007a). Specifically, Auditing Standard No. 5 states that entity-level controls include controls 
related to (1) the control environment; (2) management override;9 (3) issuer’s risk assessment 
process; (4) centralized processing, including shared service environments; (4) monitoring the 
results of operations; (5) monitoring other controls, including activities of the internal audit 
function, the audit committee, and self-assessment programs; (6) the period-end financial 
reporting process; and (7) policies that address significant business control and risk 
management practices. One author and one graduate student independently classified the 
entity-level controls according to these categories and met to resolve differences. The few 
differences in coding noted (less than 2%) were resolved through discussion and consultation 
with the first author. In addition, we associated each entity-level deficiency categorized 
                                                          
9 Auditing Standard No. 5 states, “Controls over management override are important to effective internal control 
over financial reporting for all companies, and may be particularly important at smaller companies because of the 
increased involvement of senior management in performing controls and in the period-end financial reporting 
process. For smaller companies, the controls that address the risk of management override might be different 
from those at a larger company. For example, a smaller company might rely on more detailed oversight by the 
audit committee that focuses on the risk of management override” (PCAOB, 2007a, paragraph 24). The AICPA 
(2005) notes that management override of internal controls is the “Achilles’ heel” of fraud prevention.  
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according to Auditing Standard No. 5 with both firm size (the four Big 4 firms and four second-
tier firms) to address RQ2, and with time (years 2010–2015) to address RQ3. 
To examine more closely the application-level control deficiencies, similar to the 
approach taken by Church and Shefchik (2012), we used the results of the initial NVivo word 
count for application control to identify the specific account that was referenced for each 
application-level control deficiency. Iterative searches on words closely associated with our 
initial word count were performed to ensure that all accounts referenced for each application-
level control deficiency were identified.  We discovered that some application-level control 
deficiencies referred to more than one account. We also related the accounts affected by each 
application-level deficiency to firm size, to address RQ2, and to time, to address RQ3.  
4. Results  
4.1 Type of control deficiencies  
RQ1 investigates the type of control audit deficiencies. Table 1 lists the number of 
issuers with deficiencies for all audit firms. Exhibit 2 illustrates selected comments from the 
inspection reports. As shown in Panel A of Table 1, the PCAOB inspection teams found 
deficiencies in 38% (703) of the issuers they examined for the largest eight audit firms for 
inspection years 2010 to 2015. Of the 5,209 total deficiencies identified, 17% (869) were 
control-related, and 83% (4,339) were other deficiencies. Panel A of Table 2 shows that 27% 
(237) of the 869 control deficiencies identified were classified as entity-level control 
deficiencies and 73% (632) were classified as application-level control deficiencies. Finally, 43% 
(101) of the entity-level control deficiencies involved ITGCs.  
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[Insert Exhibit 2 and Tables 1 and 2 about here.] 
4.1.1 Classification of entity-level control deficiencies 
We categorized entity-level control deficiencies by Auditing Standard No. 5 categories as 
shown in Table 3. Ninety-four (40%) of these entity-level deficiencies involved centralized 
processing and controls, including shared service environments; 58 (24%) related to controls 
over the period-end financial reporting process; and 30 (13%) involved controls to monitor 
results of operations. Untabulated results suggest that many entity-level control deficiencies 
involving centralized processing and controls were related to examining access controls over 
data and system resources—for example, auditors’ improper examination of the ability to 
change program logic, failure to restrict programmer access to system resources, or unlimited 
access to computer resources. The most frequently cited controls over the period-end financial 
reporting process were manual adjustments/journal entries, failure to coordinate financial 
close, and unlimited access to accounting system resources.  
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
4.1.2 Classification of application-level control deficiencies  
Panel A of Table 4 identifies the accounts involved for the application-level control 
deficiencies. Similar to DeFond and Lennox (2017), Panel B reports the deficiencies identified in 
PCAOB inspections scaled by total number of issuers with deficiencies. Panel B shows that 25% 
of all issuers with deficiencies had deficiencies involving revenue accounts, 17% of all issuers 
with deficiencies had deficiencies related to inventory accounts, and 14% of all issuers had 
deficiencies related to accounts receivable. Further, 10% of all issuers with deficiencies 
experienced deficiencies concerning investment accounts.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
4.2 Impact of firm size on control audit deficiencies 
RQ2 asks whether the type of control audit deficiencies varies by firm size. As shown in 
Table 1, Panels B and C, the PCAOB found deficiencies in 35% of the audits performed by Big 4 
firms and found deficiencies in 45% of the audits performed by second-tier firms. Tests of 
equality of proportions show a statistically significant difference between deficiency rates by 
firm size, where χ2 = 15.26 and p < 0.0001.  
Of the 3,601 total deficiencies identified for Big 4 firms, 617 (17%) were control 
deficiencies. The percentage of total deficiencies identified as control deficiencies varied by Big 
4 firm, ranging from 16% of total deficiencies identified as control deficiencies for Deloitte and 
KPMG, to 20% of total deficiencies identified as control deficiencies for PwC. For second-tier 
firms, 253 (16%) of the 1,608 total deficiencies identified were control deficiencies. Control 
deficiencies as a percentage of total deficiencies also varied for the second-tier firms, ranging 
from 12% of total deficiencies for RSM to 21% for Crowe Horwath. Tests of equal proportions 
were used to compare differences in frequency counts between the two groups (Pedhazur and 
Schmelkin, 1991). Untabulated results indicate that the difference between Big 4 and second-
tier firms for their proportion of total control deficiencies relative to all other deficiencies 
identified was not statistically significant (χ2 = 1.57; p = 0.211).  
Table 2, Panel D indicates that of the control deficiencies attributed to Big 4 firms, 151 
(25%) were entity-level and 465 (75.5%) were application-level. Of the entity-level deficiencies, 
55 (9% of all internal control deficiencies or 36% of the entity-level deficiencies) involved ITGCs. 
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As for the second-tier firm control deficiencies, Panel G of Table 2 indicates that 86 (34%) were 
entity-level and 167 (66%) were application-level. Thus, the mix between entity-level and 
application-level control deficiencies demonstrated a higher proportion of entity-level control 
deficiencies for second-tier firms than for Big 4 firms. Of the entity-level deficiencies for second-
tier firms, 46 (18% of all internal control deficiencies or 53% of entity-level deficiencies) 
involved ITGCs.  
To examine differences in the impact of firm size on the proportion of control 
deficiencies that were entity-level versus application-level, we performed chi-square tests of 
equality between two equal proportions for the two groups (Big 4 and second-tier). 
Untabulated results indicate that the proportion of entity-level versus application-level control 
deficiencies was statistically significant between Big 4 and second-tier firms (χ2 = 7.90; p = 
0.005).  
4.2.1 Impact of firm size on classification of entity-level control deficiencies  
Next, we examine the impact of firm size on the type of entity-level control deficiencies 
classified according to paragraph 24 of Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB, 2017a), with the 
results shown in Table 3. Of the 151 entity-level control deficiencies attributed to Big 4 firms, 48 
(32%) involved centralized processing and controls, 38 (25%) related to controls over the 
period-end financial reporting process, 20 (13%) involved controls to monitor results of 
operations, and 22 (15%) related to controls to monitor other controls, including activities of 
the internal audit function, audit committee, and self-assessment programs. Interestingly, 
control deficiencies attributed to second-tier firms were concentrated in three categories: 46 
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(53%) deficiencies related to centralized processing and controls, 20 (23%) deficiencies involved 
controls over the period-end financial reporting process, and 10 (12%) deficiencies involved 
controls to monitor results of operations.  
To examine differences in the type of entity-level control deficiencies between the Big 4 
and second-tier firms, we performed chi-square tests of equality between proportions for the 
two groups (Big 4 versus second-tier). Untabulated results indicate that the differences in type 
of entity-level control deficiencies were not statistically significantly between Big 4 and second-
tier firms for entity-level control deficiencies (χ2 = 5.88; p = 0.32).  
4.2.2 Impact of firm size on classification of application-level deficiencies  
The classification of application-level control deficiencies for Big 4 firms is shown in 
Panels D, E, and F of Table 4 and for second-tier firms in Panels G, H, and I. A total of 439 
accounts were identified by the PCAOB in their descriptions of the application-level control 
deficiencies for Big 4 firms and a total 167 accounts for second-tier firms. The three most 
common accounts did not vary by firm size, as most control deficiencies attributed to both Big 4 
and second-tier firms involved revenue, inventory, and accounts receivable accounts. These 
trends are consistent with prior research (Church and Shefchik, 2012).  
To compare differences in the accounts involved in application-level deficiencies 
between the Big 4 and second-tier firms, we performed chi-square tests (untabulated) of 
equality between two equal proportions for the two groups. The difference in the accounts 




4.3 Impact of time on control deficiency reporting  
RQ3 asks whether the type of control audit deficiencies identified varies from inspection 
year 2010 to year 2015. Panels A to C of Table 5 present control deficiencies grouped by year 
for all firms. Panels D to F display the control deficiencies grouped by year for Big 4 firms, and 
Panels G to I present control deficiencies grouped by year for second-tier firms. For each set of 
panels, the first shows total number of deficiencies, the second displays deficiencies scaled by 
number of issuers with deficiencies, and the third presents deficiencies scaled by number of 
issuers inspected.  
As shown in Table 5, Panel A, total control deficiencies varied significantly, from a low of 
105 for inspection year 2010 to a high of 200 for inspection year 2013. Most of the difference in 
total annual control deficiency counts can be attributed to an increase in application-level 
deficiencies, from 69 for inspection year 2010 to 157 for inspection year 2013. Other than an 
increase in entity-level deficiencies from inspection year 2013 to 2014, entity-level deficiencies 
and ITGCs remained relatively constant.  
4.3.1 Impact of time on control deficiency reporting by firm size  
While the total number of control deficiencies identified varied somewhat for both Big 4 
firms (see Panel D of Table 5) and second-tier firms (see Panel G of Table 5), untabulated results 
using chi-square tests of equal proportions indicate that the differences in proportions of total 
control deficiencies by year between Big 4 and second-tier firms were not statistically 
significant (χ2 = 6.56; p = 0.255). Interestingly, as shown Table 5, Panel D, the number of 
application-level control deficiencies found for Big 4 firms appears to have increased from 
inspection years 2010 to 2013 and then declined. Similarly, the number of application-level 
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control deficiencies for second-tier firms increased from inspection years 2010 to 2014 and 
then declined. This provides some evidence that the PCAOB is now identifying more internal 
control deficiencies than in the past (see discussion of Auditing Standard 13 in our subsection 
2.4). Untabulated results using chi-square tests of equal proportions indicate that the 
differences in application-level control deficiencies by year between Big 4 and second-tier firms 
were statistically significant (χ2 = 17.13; p = 0.004). There may be several explanations for these 
differences, including that the PCAOB is concentrating its efforts on application-level controls, 
that audit firms are not concentrating their efforts on application-level controls, or that issuers 
in general are experiencing more application-level control challenges.  
The number of entity-level deficiencies for both Big 4 and second-tier firms remained 
relatively steady except for a significant increase for Big 4 firms between inspection years 2013 
and 2014. Untabulated results using chi-square tests of equal proportions indicate that the 
differences in entity-level control deficiencies by year between Big 4 and second-tier firms were 
not statistically significant (χ2 = 5.63; p = 0.344). Similarly, the number of ITGCs for both Big 4 
and second-tier firms remained relatively steady. Untabulated results using chi-square tests of 
equal proportions indicate that the differences in ITGCs by year between Big 4 and second-tier 
firms were not statistically significant (χ2 = 6.09; p = 0.297). 
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
4.4 Additional analysis—impact of entity-level control deficiencies on issuers’ financial 
statements  
 
As noted earlier, entity-level deficiencies may increase the probability of an adverse 
opinion on controls over the financial reporting process or the risk of material misstatement. 
Additional untabulated analysis indicate that PCAOB inspectors explicitly noted that some 
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entity-level deficiencies affected issuers’ financial statements. For Big 4 firms, the PCAOB found 
that deficiencies for four issuers audited by PwC and three issuers audited by EY resulted in 
issuers restating their financial statements after the preliminary PCAOB inspection process. 
Further, 11 entity-level deficiencies resulted in issuers audited by PwC revising their opinion on 
the effectiveness of their internal control over financial reporting to express an adverse 
opinion. Interestingly, four of these occurred in inspection year 2014 and six in inspection year 
2015. For the second-tier firms, entity-level control deficiencies resulted in subsequent financial 
statement restatements for two issuers audited by BDO and two issuers audited by Grant 
Thornton.  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Discussion 
Understanding how auditors evaluate internal controls and whether the PCAOB 
inspection process is satisfied with the current procedures used is important, as regulators, 
practitioners, and academics continue to stress the role of internal controls in corporate 
governance (DeFond and Lennox, 2017; Hoitash et al., 2009). This study uses text analysis to 
examine the content of PCAOB inspection reports regarding internal control deficiencies and 
reporting trends for the largest eight U.S. public accounting firms, grouped into Big 4 firms and 
second-tier firms. Specifically, the study examines PCAOB inspection reports and categorizes 
internal control deficiencies as either entity-level or application-level. These controls have 
differing impact on preventing and detecting material financial statement misstatements 
(Dickins and Fay, 2017). For example, entity-level control deficiencies may impact the internal 
control environment systemically and ultimately the quality of financial statements (Church and 
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Shefchik, 2012), thus auditors should perform additional testing. In contrast, application-level 
controls may introduce erroneous and/or fraudulent transactions into the system, but such 
risks generally do not affect all transactions or the system as a whole (PCAOB, 2007a). However, 
when auditors discover many application-level control deficiencies for one issuer, it may signal 
that entity-level controls, including ITGCs, are not operating effectively for that issuer. In a 
report on its inspections, the PCAOB (2008, 17) noted that auditors often did not test controls 
they relied on, failed to test controls sufficiently, or relied on ineffective controls. Thus, 
exploring internal control deficiencies including ITGCs is relevant to researchers, standard 
setters, and practitioners who work to improve audit quality.  
After initially categorizing internal control deficiencies into entity-level versus 
application-level deficiencies, we further categorize the entity-level type deficiencies according 
to Auditing Standard No. 5 categories for entity-level internal control deficiencies (e.g., 
centralized IT processing, period-end financial reporting process, etc.) and subcategorize the 
application-level type deficiencies according to the account affected (e.g., accounts receivable, 
revenue, etc.). While Church and Shefchik (2012) examined application-level deficiencies, ours 
is the first study of which we are aware to isolate the Auditing Standard No. 5 categories of 
entity-level deficiencies. Such work provides an informational resource for both regulators and 
practitioners by highlighting the areas that pose the most common entity-level risks. With the 
entity-level and application-level deficiencies coded by type and subtype and for firm and year, 
we analyze whether control deficiencies differ statistically by audit firm size (Big 4 versus 
second-tier) or over time (across inspection years 2010 to 2015).  
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Our results show that the percentage of issuers with control deficiencies is higher for 
second-tier than for Big 4 firms, although there is no significant difference in the number of 
control deficiencies between Big 4 and second-tier firms on a weighted basis. This is not the 
case for application-level control deficiencies, however. The PCAOB identified significantly more 
application-level control deficiencies for Big 4 firms than for second-tier firms, and the 
difference between the number of entity-level and application-level control deficiencies is also 
statistically significant. This is not surprising, as application-level deficiencies occur at the 
transaction level while entity-level deficiencies occur across transactions.  
In comparing application-level with entity-level control deficiencies, we note that the 
percentage of control deficiencies identified as application-level deficiencies is 75% for Big 4 
firms and 66% for second-tier firms. Further, the number of application-level internal control 
deficiencies identified for Big 4 firms varies significantly between inspection years 2010 and 
2015. The attention paid to application-level controls may be the result of recent risk 
assessment audit standard releases (i.e., Auditing Standard No. 12, Auditing Standard No. 13, 
and Auditing Standard No. 14). Indeed, these audit standards appear frequently in the reports 
for inspection years 2012 and 2013. Interestingly, the number of entity-level internal control 
deficiencies (including ITGCs) attributed by the PCAOB to both Big 4 and second-tier firms 
remained relatively flat from inspection years 2010 to 2015, although the percentage of entity-
level control deficiencies for Big 4 and second-tier firms accounts for 25% and 34% of their total 
deficiencies, respectively. This finding suggests two potential trends. First, application-level 
control deficiencies continue to represent the majority of deficiencies for both firm types; 
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second, entity-level deficiencies are gaining in emphasis, if only from a percentage-of-total 
standpoint. 
Our analysis of entity-level control deficiencies indicates that the PCAOB is focusing 
more on access controls over data, system resources, and IT tools. For example, the ability to 
change program logic, a failure to restrict programmer access to system resources, and 
unlimited access to computer resources are the most frequently noted deficiencies classified as 
involving centralized processing and controls. Similarly, the most frequently cited controls over 
the period-end financial reporting process are manual adjustments/journal entries, failure to 
coordinate financial close, and unlimited access to accounting system resources. Consistent 
with Church and Shefchik (2012), we note that deficiencies in revenue, inventory, and accounts 
receivable accounts are the most frequently cited under application-level controls for both Big 
4 and second-tier firms, despite over a decade of inspections. 
The effectiveness of application-level controls depends on ITGC such as access control 
and change management controls (PCAOB, 2013; Calderon et al., 2016). Further, recent 
practitioner articles note that auditors still struggle with evaluating ITGCs (Calderon et al., 2016; 
Lewczyk, 2016). Finally, a recent PCAOB Practice Alert identifies examples of auditors selecting 
ITGCs for testing, but failing to (1) test that the selected ITGCs are important to the effective 
operations of the applications that generated the data or reports, (2) test the query logic used 
to extract data from the IT applications used in the reports, or (3) address control deficiencies 
that were identified with respect to the ITCGs over either the applications that process the data 
used in the reports or the applications that generated the reports (PCAOB, 2013, 26). Taken 
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together, more research to examine the impact of ITGCs on clients’ financial reporting systems 
is needed (Klamm and Watson, 2009; Wallace et al., 2011; Li et al., 2018).  
Further, recent developments in information technology adopted by companies such as 
Blockchain would require the creation of new and complex ITGCs that might increase the risk of 
having more audit deficiencies in this area. Future research might look closer to the ITGCs 
environment to identify specific factors related to the creation and effectiveness of ITGCs like 
set of skills to be required for managers and auditors in charge of monitoring and assessing, the 
implementation of internal controls, respectively.     
Taken together our findings show that PCAOB inspection reports remain focused mainly 
on application-level controls for Big 4 firms but have increased their focus on entity-level 
controls as well. Our findings may imply that audit firms need to better train their staff on how 
to identify and evaluate control deficiencies and to practice professional skepticism needed to 
avoid yielding to client management’s assurances that internal controls have been properly 
tested. Furthermore, at present, IT audit specialists are not considered to be specialists per 
Audit Standard 1210, which states that auditors should have information technology skills 
(PCAOB, 2017c). Our findings, along with results from Jenkins et al. (2018), may suggest that the 
role of IT audit specialists in identifying control deficiencies should be increased and perhaps 
that the current standards need to be modified to consider IT specialists to be specialists.  
5.2 Limitations 
As with all research, there are limitations to our study. First, our sample includes only six 
years of inspection reports for Big 4 and second-tier firms. Future research can examine PCAOB 
inspection reports for additional years. Second, we examine only the eight largest U.S. public 
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accounting firms. Whether our results will generalize to smaller firms or foreign firms remains 
an open question. Third, our analysis does not allow us to determine if Big 4 audit firms are not 
properly identifying internal control deficiencies, as evidenced by the differences in deficiencies 
across inspection years 2010 to 2015, or if the PCAOB inspectors are now better trained to 
identify such deficiencies (Johnson et al., 2017).10  
5.3 Conclusion 
Given the risk-based emphasis of the PCAOB inspection process (Abernathy et al., 2013; 
Bhaskar 2017; Carson et al., 2017; Drake et al., 2017; Son et al., 2017), the PCAOB’s inspection 
process may not perfectly identify all cases of internal control audit deficiencies. Future 
research into how to improve the PCAOB inspection process for identifying internal control 
deficiencies may be warranted. Some researchers suggest that auditors may focus on managing 
inspection outcomes by directing resources to areas they believe will be inspected rather than 
to those with a high risk of material misstatement (Boland et al., 2017; Glover et al., 2017; 
Glover and Prawitt, 2013; Houston and Stefaniak, 2013; Stefaniak et al., 2016). Whether our 
results suggesting that a greater concentration of application-level control deficiencies stems 
from auditors concentrating on detecting entity-level control problems due to their belief that 
the PCAOB is more likely to examine entity-level controls remains a subject for future research.  
  
                                                          
10 We note that the PCAOB budget for inspections has nearly doubled from $68.8 million in fiscal year 2009 to 
$124.4 million in fiscal year 2015 (Walworth and Hale, 2017). We were unable to determine whether the PCAOB 
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Summary information for inspection years 2010 to 2015—control deficiencies, other deficiencies, and total deficiencies. 

















Total 1,836 703 38% 869 17% 4,339 83% 5,209  
 

















Deloitte 318 100 31% 108 16% 567 84% 675 
E&Y 335 122 36% 188 17% 927 83% 1,115 
KPMG 297 108 36% 162 16% 842 84% 1,004 
PwC 358 134 37% 159 20% 648 80% 807 




Table 1 (continued) 
Summary information for inspection years 2010 to 2015—control deficiencies, other deficiencies, and total deficiencies. 


















BDO 142 70 49% 93 14% 569 86% 662 
Crowe Horwath 79 35 44% 16 21% 59 79% 75 
Grant Thornton 213 88 41% 110 19% 479 81% 589 
RSM 94 46 49% 34 12% 248 88% 282 
Total 528 239 45% 253 16% 1355 84% 1,608 
a Total control deficiencies as a percentage of total deficiencies identified. 









Type of control deficiencies for inspection years 2010 to 2015. 
Panel A: Deficiencies for all firms unscaled 
 Entity Percent
a ITGCb Percentc Application Percentd 
Total control 
deficiencies    
Total 237 27.4% 101 11.6% 632 72.6% 869    
Panel B: Deficiencies for all firms scaled by number of issuers with deficiencies    
 Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies    
Total 0.34   0.14    0.90    1.24     
Panel C: Deficiencies for all firms scaled by number of issuers inspected    
 Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies    
Total 0.13   0.06    0.34    0.47     
 
a Total entity-level control deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified.  
b ITGC refers to information technology general controls and represents a subset of entity-level control deficiencies. 
c Total ITGC deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified. 






Table 2 (continued) 
Type of control deficiencies for inspection years 2010 to 2015.  
Panel D: Deficiencies for Big 4 firms unscaled  
Firm Entity Percenta ITGCb Percentc Application Percentd 
Total control 
deficiencies    
Deloitte 14 13.0% 5 4.6% 94 87.0% 108    
EY 44 23.5% 17 9.1% 143 76.5% 187    
KPMG 45 27.8% 17 10.5% 117 72.2% 162    
PwC 48 30.2% 16 10.1% 111 69.8% 159    
Total 151 24.5% 55 8.9% 465 75.5% 616    
Panel E: Deficiencies for Big 4 firms scaled by number of issuers with deficiencies    
Firm Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies    
Deloitte 0.14   0.05    0.94    1.08     
EY 0.36   0.14    1.17    1.53     
KPMG 0.42   0.16    1.08    1.50     
PwC 0.36   0.12    0.83    1.19     
Total 0.33   0.12    1.00    1.33     
Panel F: Deficiencies for Big 4 firms scaled by number of issuers inspected    
Firm Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies    
Deloitte 0.04   0.02    0.30    0.34     
EY 0.13   0.05    0.43    0.56     
KPMG 0.15   0.06    0.39    0.55     
PwC 0.13   0.04    0.31    0.44     
Total 0.12   0.04    0.36    0.47     
 
a Total entity-level control deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified.  
b ITGC refers to information technology general controls and represents a subset of entity-level control deficiencies. 
c Total ITGC deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified. 
d Total application-level control deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified.  
40 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
Type of control deficiencies for inspection years 2010 to 2015. 
Panel G: Deficiencies for second-tier firms unscaled 
Firm Entity Percenta ITGCb Percentc Application Percentd 
Total 
control 
deficiencies   
BDO 25 26.9% 15 16.1% 68 73.1% 93   
Crowe Horwath 12 75.0% 7 43.8% 4 25.0% 16   
Grant Thornton  35 31.8% 17 15.5% 75 68.2% 110   
RSM  14 41.2% 7 20.6% 20 58.8% 34   
Total  86 34.0% 46 18.2% 167 66.0% 253   
Panel H: Deficiencies for second-tier firms scaled by number of issuers with deficiencies   
Firm Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total 
control 
deficiencies   
BDO  0.36    0.21    0.97    1.33    
Crowe Horwath  0.34    0.20    0.11    0.46    
Grant Thornton  0.40    0.19    0.85    1.25    
RSM   0.30    0.15    0.43    0.74    
Total   0.36    0.19    0.70    1.06    
Panel I: Deficiencies for second-tier firms scaled by number of issuers inspected   
Firm Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total 
control 
deficiencies   
BDO  0.18    0.11    0.48    0.65    
Crowe Horwath  0.15    0.09    0.05    0.20    
Grant Thornton   0.16    0.08    0.35    0.52    
RSM   0.12    0.06    0.17    0.29    
Total   0.16    0.08    0.30    0.46    
 
a Total entity-level control deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified.  
b ITGC refers to information technology general controls and represents a subset of entity-level control 
deficiencies. 
c Total ITGC deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified. 




Table 3  


















Controls to monitor 
other controls, 
including activities 

























Big 4          
Deloitte 5 1 3 2 2 0 1 0 14 
EY 10 18 7 6 3 0 0 0 44 
KPMG 17 9 4 6 5 4 0 0 45 
PwC 16 10 6 8 7 1 0 0 48 
Total 48 38 20 22 17 5 1 0 151 
          
Second-tier          
BDO 15 5 2 2 0 0 1 0 25 
Crowe Horwath 7 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 12 
Grant Thornton 17 8 4 2 3 1 0 0 35 
RSM  7 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 14 
Total 46 20 10 4 4 1 1 0 86 
          
Total all firms 94 58 30 26 21 6 2 0 237 
 
a Entity-level control deficiencies related to ITGCs include 94 controls related to the category of “Centralized processing and controls, including shared 
service environments” as well as 7 controls categorized as “Controls over period-end financial reporting process”. This resulted in a count of 101 ITGCs 








Table 4  
Application-level control deficiencies by account affected for inspection years 2010 to 2015. 
          







 Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill assets Liabilities Total
a 
Total all firms 174 101 117 71 28 46 61 8 606 
          
Panel B: Deficiencies for all firms scaled by number of issuers with deficiencies     
 Loans  Other   
 Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill assets Liabilities Total 
Total all firms  0.25   0.14   0.17   0.10   0.04   0.07   0.09   0.01   0.86 
 
Panel C: Deficiencies for all firms scaled by number of issuers inspected 
 Loans  Other   
 Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill assets Liabilities Total 
Total all firms  0.09   0.05   0.06   0.04   0.02   0.02   0.03   0.00   0.33  
 
  






Table 4 (continued) 
Application-level control deficiencies by account affected for inspection years 2010 to 2015. 
.          





Firm Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill Assets Liabilities Totalb 
Deloitte 20 5 20 14 7 10 11 5 92 
EY 41 19 30 14 1 11 15 1 132 
KPMG 27 29 15 19 13 0 11 1 115 
PwC 30 18 19 6 2 10 14 1 100 
Total 118 71 84 53 23 31 51 8 439 
          
Panel E: Deficiencies for Big 4 firms scaled by number of issuers with deficiencies   
 Loans  Other   
Firm Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill Assets Liabilities Total 
Deloitte  0.20   0.05   0.20   0.14   0.07   0.10   0.11   0.05   0.92  
EY  0.34   0.16   0.25   0.11   0.01   0.09   0.12   0.01   1.08  
KPMG  0.25   0.27   0.14   0.18   0.12   —   0.10   0.01   1.06  
PwC  0.22   0.13   0.14   0.04   0.01   0.07   0.10   0.01   0.75  
Total  0.25   0.15   0.18   0.11   0.05   0.07   0.11   0.02   0.95  
          
Panel F: Deficiencies for Big 4 firms scaled by number of issuers inspected   
 Loans  Other   
Firm Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill Assets Liabilities Total 
Deloitte  0.06   0.02   0.06   0.04   0.02   0.03   0.03   0.02   0.29  
EY  0.12   0.06   0.09   0.04   0.00   0.03   0.04   0.00   0.39  
KPMG  0.09   0.10   0.05   0.06   0.04   —   0.04   0.00   0.39  
PwC  0.08   0.05   0.05   0.02   0.01   0.03   0.04   0.00   0.28  
Total  0.09   0.05   0.06   0.04   0.02   0.02   0.04   0.01   0.34  
          
 




Table 4 (continued) 
Application-level control deficiencies by account affected for inspection years 2010 to 2015. 
 
Panel G: Deficiencies for second-tier firms unscaled      
 
   Loans  Other   
Firm Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill Assets Liabilities Totalc 
BDO 21 9 20 10 1 4 3 0 68 
Crowe Horwath 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 
Grant Thornton 31 14 10 6 0 11 3 0 75 
RSM 4 5 3 2 3 0 3 0 20 
Total 56 30 33 18 5 15 10 0 167 
          
Panel H: Deficiencies for second-tier firms scaled by number of Issuers with deficiencies 
 Loans  Other   
Firm Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill Assets Liabilities Total 
BDO  0.30   0.13   0.29   0.14   0.01   0.06   0.04   —   0.97  
Crowe Horwath  —   0.06   —   —   0.03   —   0.03   —   0.11  
Grant Thornton  0.35   0.16   0.11   0.07   —   0.13   0.03   —   0.85  
RSM  0.09   0.11   0.07   0.04   0.07   —   0.07   —   0.43  
Total  0.23   0.13   0.14   0.08   0.02   0.06   0.04   —   0.70  
          
Panel I: Deficiencies for second-tier firms scaled by number of issuers inspected     
   Loans  Other   
Firm Revenue A/R Inventory Investments (assets) Goodwill Assets Liabilities Total 
BDO  0.15   0.06   0.14   0.07   0.01   0.03   0.02   —   0.48  
Crowe Horwath  —   0.03   —   —   0.01   —   0.01   —   0.05  
Grant Thornton  0.15   0.07   0.05   0.03   —   0.05   0.01   —   0.35  
RSM  0.03   0.04   0.03   0.02   0.03   —   0.03   —   0.21  
Total  0.10   0.05   0.06   0.03   0.01   0.03   0.02   —   0.32  
          




Trends in control deficiencies reporting. 
Panel A: Deficiencies for all firms unscaled 
Inspection 
yeara Entity Percentb ITGCc Percentd Application Percente 
Total control 
deficiencies Percent 
2010 36 34.3% 15 14.3% 69 65.7% 105 100% 
2011 36 25.2% 13 9.1% 107 74.8% 143 100% 
2012 34 25.4% 14 10.4% 100 74.6% 134 100% 
2013 43 21.5% 25 12.5% 157 78.5% 200 100% 
2014 59 33.7% 21 12.0% 116 66.3% 175 100% 
2015 29 25.9% 13 11.6% 83 74.1% 112 100% 
Total 237 27.3% 101 11.6% 632 72.7% 869 100% 
Panel B: Deficiencies for all firms scaled by number of issuers with deficiencies 
Inspection 
year Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies  
2010  0.31    0.13    0.58    0.89   
2011  0.30    0.11    0.89    1.19   
2012  0.27    0.11    0.79    1.06   
2013  0.34    0.20    1.24    1.57   
2014  0.50    0.18    0.97    1.47   
2015  0.32    0.14    0.90    1.22   
Total  0.34    0.14    0.90    1.24   
 
Panel C: Deficiencies for all firms scaled by number of issuers inspected 
Inspection 
year Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies  
2010  0.10    0.04    0.20    0.30   
2011  0.12    0.04    0.35    0.47   
2012  0.12    0.05    0.34    0.46   
2013  0.15    0.09    0.54    0.68   
2014  0.20    0.07    0.39    0.58   
2015  0.10    0.04    0.28    0.38   
Total  0.13    0.06    0.34    0.47   
 
a PCAOB inspection year. Each report was publicly issued one year later. For example, the 2010 inspection year 
report was made public in 2011. 
b Total entity-level control deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified.  
c ITGC refers to information technology general controls. 
d Total ITGC deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified. 




TABLE 5 (continued) 
Trends in control deficiencies reporting.  
Panel D: Deficiencies for Big 4 firms unscaled 
Inspection 
yeara Entity Percentb ITGCc Percentd Application Percente 
Total control 
deficiencies Percent 
2010 22 27.8% 5 6.3% 57 72.2% 79 100% 
2011 22 22.4% 6 6.1% 76 77.6% 98 100% 
2012 20 20.4% 8 8.2% 78 79.6% 98 100% 
2013 24 16.2% 15 10.1% 124 83.8% 148 100% 
2014 43 38.1% 11 9.7% 70 61.9% 113 100% 
2015 20 25.0% 10 12.5% 60 75.0% 80 100% 
Total 151 24.5% 55 8.9% 465 75.5% 616 100% 
Panel E: Deficiencies for Big 4 firms scaled by number of issuers with deficiencies 
Inspection 
year Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies  
2010  0.31    0.07    0.79    1.10   
2011  0.28    0.08    0.95    1.23   
2012  0.25    0.10    0.96    1.21   
2013  0.26    0.16    1.32    1.57   
2014  0.57    0.14    0.92    1.49   
2015  0.33    0.16    0.98    1.31   
Total  0.33    0.12    1.00    1.33   
Panel F: Deficiencies for Big 4 firms scaled by number of inspected firms 
Inspection 
year Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies  
2010  0.09    0.02    0.24    0.33   
2011  0.10    0.03    0.35    0.45   
2012  0.10    0.04    0.37    0.47   
2013  0.11    0.07    0.59    0.70   
2014  0.20    0.05    0.32    0.52   
2015  0.09    0.05    0.28    0.38   
Total  0.12    0.04    0.36    0.47   
         
a PCAOB inspection year. Each report was publicly issued one year later. For example, the 2010 inspection year 
report was made public in 2011. 
b Total entity-level control deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified.  
c ITGC refers to information technology general controls. 
d Total ITGC deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified. 




Table 5 (continued)  
Trends in control deficiencies reporting. 
Panel G: Deficiencies for second-tier firms unscaled 
Inspection 
yeara Entity Percentb ITGCc Percentd Application Percente 
Total control 
deficiencies Percent 
2010 14 53.8% 10 38.5% 12 46.2% 26 100% 
2011 14 31.1% 7 15.6% 31 68.9% 45 100% 
2012 14 38.9% 6 16.7% 22 61.1% 36 100% 
2013 19 36.5% 10 19.2% 33 63.5% 52 100% 
2014 16 25.8% 10 16.1% 46 74.2% 62 100% 
2015 9 28.1% 3 9.4% 23 71.9% 32 100% 
Total 86 34.0% 46 18.2% 167 66.0% 253 100% 
         
Panel H: Deficiencies for second-tier firms scaled by number of issuers with deficiencies 
Inspection 
year Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies  
2010  0.30   0.22   0.26    0.57   
2011  0.35  
 
 0.18  
 
 0.78    1.13   
2012  0.30  
 
 0.13  
 
 0.48    0.78   
2013  0.58    0.30    1.00    1.58   
2014  0.37    0.23    1.07    1.44   
2015  0.29  
 
 0.10  
 
 0.74    1.03   
Total  0.36  
 
 0.19  
 
 0.70    1.06   
Panel I: Deficiencies for second-tier firms scaled by number of issuers inspected firms 
Inspection 
year Entity  ITGC  Application  
Total control 
deficiencies  
2010  0.11   0.08   0.10    0.21    
2011  0.16  
 
 0.08  
 
 0.36    0.52    
2012  0.17  
 
 0.07  
 
 0.27    0.43    
2013  0.23  
 
 0.12  
 
 0.40    0.63    
2014  0.19    0.12    0.54    0.73   
2015  0.10    0.03    0.27    0.37   
Total  0.16  
 
 0.08  
 
 0.30    0.46    
a PCAOB inspection year. Each report was publicly issued one year later. For example, the 2010 inspection year report was 
made public in 2011. 
b Total entity-level control deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified.  
c ITGC refers to information technology general controls. 
d Total ITGC deficiencies as a percentage of total control deficiencies identified. 












Word trees based on NVivo text search queries 
 
Panel A: Word tree for internal control 
 
 



















Step 2 Identify entity-
level control 
deficiencies 
Step 3 Identify 
application-level 
control deficiencies 




 No. 5 categories 




Step 1 Identify internal 
control deficiencies 
 
Perform NVivo word 
cloud analysis for 
“internal control” 
Manually examine 
NVivo text passages 
for validation that each 
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Exhibit 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Steps in text analysis using NVivo  
 
Step 1  Identify internal control deficiencies 
 Performed word cloud analysis on the PCAOB inspection reports 
A. Based on output, identified text associated with the term “internal control” 
B. Examined the text passage manually for validation of NVivo results (e.g.: 
Were any issues surrounding internal control omitted from NVivo results?)  
 
Step 2  Identify entity-level control deficiencies 
 Performed word cloud analysis for “entity-level” control deficiencies 
A. Using text search, identified control deficiencies associated with entity-
level issues. 
B. Performed a word cloud analysis to identify the most common terms 
associated with entity-level control deficiencies. 
C. Selected search terms applicable to entity-level controls using NVivo based 
on the word cloud analysis. Terms included “manual journal entries,” 
“ITGC,” and “computer access.”  
D. Examined the underlying text passage for classification verification.  
 
Step 3  Identify application-level control deficiencies 
 Performed word cloud analysis for “application-level” control deficiencies 
A. Using text search, identified control deficiencies associated with 
application-level issues. 
B. Performed a word cloud analysis to identify the most common terms 
associated with application-level control deficiencies. 
C. Selected search terms applicable to application-level controls using NVivo 
based on the word cloud analysis. Terms included “revenue,” “inventory,” 
“accounts receivable.”  
D. Examined the underlying text passage for classification verification.  
 
Step 4  Classify entity-level control deficiencies into Auditing Standard No. 5 categories 
Using the entity-level control deficiencies identified in Step 2, one coauthor and one 
graduate assistant classified each entity-level control deficiency into one of seven 




Exhibit 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Steps in text search process using NVivo 
 
   
Step 5  Identify application-level control deficiency accounts 
Using application-level control deficiencies identified in Step 3 and output from word 
cloud analysis, entered the most common account names (top 10) into the text search in 
NVivo.  
A. Based on the word cloud results, determined that between 7 to 10 
accounts appeared on a consistent basis and limited our further search to 
these accounts. 
B. Based on the text search output for the common accounts mentioned in 
the PCAOB document, examined the underlying text and classified the 
control deficiency according to the scheme mentioned previously. Applied 
judgment as to whether the control deficiency was so pervasive, meaning 
it affected multiple accounts (e.g., revenue, accounts receivable, inventory, 






Selected comments from PCAOB inspection reports 
 
Panel A: Entity-level control deficiencies 
“The Firm identified and tested a total of three controls over revenue. One of the controls 
consisted of the issuer's comparison of the terms in customer purchase orders to the terms for 
those orders entered into the issuer's accounting system. The other two controls were 
automated information technology ("IT") controls designed to (1) compare prices to a master 
price list and suspend the processing of orders with pricing differences over certain thresholds 
and (2) generate customer invoices and record product sales at the time products were 
shipped. The Firm failed to identify that the controls it selected and tested were not designed 
to address, and it did not identify and test any other controls that addressed, the accuracy of 
(1) the master price list used in the first IT control and (2) the quantities used in the second IT 
control that were included in the invoices and used to record product sales. (AS No. 5, 
paragraph 39)” (PCAOB; Deloitte 2016 report date, Issuer H) (2015 inspection year) 
 
"The Firm failed to test journal entries recorded at the issuer's individual locations, despite 
ineffective controls over access to the locations' general ledger systems, fraud at the locations, 
and a significant volume of journal entries processed at the locations." (PCAOB; EY 2012 report 
date, Issuer A) (2011 inspection year) 
 
"The issuer's period-end financial reporting process was decentralized and included manual 
activities at the various locations. The Firm identified deficiencies related to controls over 
journal entries at the locations involved in the period-end financial ledger during the reporting 
process. The Firm also determined that large numbers of personnel had the ability to modify 
general records related to the period-end financial reporting process. The Firm failed to 
perform sufficient testing of certain controls related to the period-end financial reporting 
process." (PCAOB; EY 2012 report date, Issuer B) (2011 inspection year) 
 
"While the Firm identified and tested controls that addressed the risks associated with the fact 
that certain users could access all programs and data without first needing to access an 
application, its testing did not address the risk that the issuer had granted other users similar 
access to some, but not all, programs and data without first needing to access an application." 
(PCAOB; KPMG 2012 report date, Issuer F) (2011 inspection year) 
 
"The issuer's policy allowed for certain members of senior management both to request and to 
approve access to significant financial applications, and also to perform the annual review of 
user access to these applications. In addition, the issuer's general ledger application was set up 
in a way that could allow users to circumvent user-access controls to make changes to the data 
in the general ledger. There was no evidence in the audit documentation, and no persuasive 
other evidence, that the Firm had identified the risks associated with either of these 
circumstances or had tested controls that addressed these risks." (PCAOB; KPMG 2012 report 
date, Issuer F) (2011 inspection year) 
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Panel A: Entity-level control deficiencies (continued) 
"In addition, the Firm identified a specific risk of fraudulent journal entries, but failed to include 
journal entries recorded in the general ledgers of these units in its population of journal entries 
subject to testing." (PCAOB; PwC 2012 report date, Issuer O) (2011 inspection year) 
 
“The issuer engaged an external party ("the consultants") to perform its testing of controls. The 
Firm used the work of the consultants as evidence of the operating effectiveness of controls for 
almost all of the controls that the Firm considered to be of low and medium risk and that the 
Firm selected for testing, The Firm's use of the work of the consultants was excessive because 
the Firm's testing of the consultants' work was limited to reperformance for a small percentage 
of the controls, even though the Firm had information indicating that the consultants might 
have a low level of objectivity because they were engaged by the issuer's management and 
reported directly to the control owner for some of the controls they tested. (AU 322, 
paragraphs .10, .24, and .26)” (PCAOB; PwC 2016 report date, Issuer B) (2015 inspection year) 
 
“The Firm failed to evaluate whether various misstatements and exceptions that it identified in its 
testing resulted from control deficiencies. (AS No. 5, paragraphs 48 and B8)” (PCAOB; BDO report date 
2013, Issuer A) (2012 inspection year) 
“In this audit, the Firm failed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support its audit opinion 
on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as its procedures to test the 
operating effectiveness of controls over the occurrence of revenue were insufficient. Specifically, for 
one of the two controls tested, the Firm's procedures were limited to observing an electronic stamp as 
evidence that the control had operated. The Firm, however, failed to test whether any of the actions 
required by the control had been performed. (AS No. 5, paragraph 44)” (PCAOB; Crowe Horwath LLP 
report date 2016, Issuer B) (2015 inspection year) 
 
“The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures to test information technology general controls 
("ITGCs"). Specifically, with respect to certain important financial applications, the Firm failed to test the 
ITGCs over the databases and operating systems supporting them, test whether the issuer had 
appropriate segregation of duties over program changes, test whether the population used for testing 
program changes was complete, and test certain controls that the Firm had identified as compensating 
controls for an ITGC deficiency.” (PCAOB; Grant Thornton report date 2012, Issuer A) (2010 inspection 
year) 
 
“The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures to test controls over the accuracy and completeness of 
system-generated reports used in the performance of management's review controls. Specifically, the 
Firm failed to test security access controls over the database supporting the application that generated 
those reports or perform other procedures to test related internal controls. (AS No. 5, paragraph 39)” 
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Panel B: Application-level control deficiencies 
“The Firm designed its substantive procedures – including sample sizes and, in the performance 
of substantive analytical procedures for one location, thresholds for investigation of differences 
from expectations – to test the valuation of certain inventory based on a level of control 
reliance that was not supported due to the deficiencies in the Firm's testing of controls that are 
discussed above. As a result, certain of the sample sizes the Firm used to test the valuation of 
this inventory were too small to provide sufficient evidence, and certain of the thresholds for 
further investigation were too high. (AS No. 13, paragraphs 16, 18, and 37; AU 329, paragraph 
.20; AU 350, paragraphs .19 and .23)” (PCAOB; Deloitte report date 2014, Issuer E) (2013 
inspection year) 
 
“For the issuer's domestic locations, the Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures related to 
certain inventory. Specifically, the Firm selected for testing certain controls that consisted of 
the review of standard costs (including burden rates), variances, and inventory balances; 
however, the Firm's procedures to test these controls were insufficient. Specifically, the Firm's 
procedures were limited to inquiring of management, inspecting emails that indicated certain 
reviews had occurred, and comparing certain amounts to supporting documents and/or the 
general ledger. The Firm failed to test whether the controls operated at a level of precision that 
would prevent or detect material misstatements, as it failed to ascertain, and evaluate, (1) the 
nature of the review activities performed, (2) the criteria used to identify items for follow up, 
and (3) how those items were resolved. In addition, the Firm failed to identify and test any 
controls over the accuracy and completeness of reports that the issuer used in the performance 
of certain of these controls. Further, although the controls that the Firm tested addressed 
aspects of the capitalization rates used, the Firm failed to test any controls that addressed 
whether the types of labor and overhead costs that were included in inventory were 
appropriately capitalized. (AS No. 5, paragraphs 39, 42, and 44)” (PCAOB; EY report date 2015, 
Issuer C) (2014 inspection year) 
 
“The Firm's primary procedure to test revenue was to develop an independent expectation of 
total revenue for the year based on cash receipts for the year and changes in the balances for 
accounts receivable, relevant reserves, and deferred revenue from the beginning to the end of 
the year. The Firm failed to develop an appropriate expectation since, as noted below, the Firm 
failed to sufficiently test accounts receivable that it used in developing the expectation. While 
the Firm did perform other testing of a sample of individual revenue transactions, the sample 
size for this testing was too small, because the Firm placed unwarranted reliance on its primary 
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Panel B: Application-level control deficiencies (continued) 
“The Firm failed to perform procedures, beyond inquiry of management, to test whether the 
issuer's inventory was valued at the lower of its cost or market. In addition, the Firm failed to 
identify and test any controls over the issuer's valuation of its inventory at the lower of its cost 
or market. (AS No. 5, paragraph 39; AS No. 12, paragraphs 4, 5, and 7; AS No. 13, paragraph 8)” 
(PCAOB; PwC report date 2014, Issuer F) (2013 inspection year) 
 
“The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures to test controls over revenue. Specifically, the 
Firm's testing of certain controls over revenue and accounts receivable was insufficient, as the 
Firm limited its testing to observing sign-offs as evidence that reviews that constituted part or 
all of the controls had occurred, without evaluating whether these controls operated at a level 
of precision that would prevent or detect material misstatements. In addition, the Firm failed to 
identify and test any controls over the accuracy and completeness of data and reports used in 
(1) performing these controls or (2) determining the amount of revenue recognized at one of 
the subsidiaries. (AS No. 5, paragraphs 39, 42, and 44)” (PCAOB; BDO report date 2014, Issuer 
D) (2013 inspection year) 
 
“The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures to test the completeness and existence of 
loans acquired and deposits combinations at the date of acquisition. The Firm compared the 
acquired assumed in the business loans and assumed deposits trial balances as of the 
acquisition dates to supporting schedules provided by the issuer and confirmed a sample of 
acquired loans and assumed deposits as of an interim date approximately three months and ten 
months subsequent to the respective acquisition dates. During the year, but prior to the Firm's 
interim testing, the issuer converted the loan and deposits applications acquired in the business 
combinations to the issuer's core loan and deposits application. The Firm, however, failed to 
perform procedures to roll-back its interim confirmation procedures over loans and deposits 
that included the loans acquired and deposits assumed in the business combinations to the 
respective acquisition dates in testing the completeness and existence of those balances as of 
the acquisition dates. (AS No. 13, paragraph 8)” (PCAOB; Crowe Horwath 2015 report date, 
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Panel B: Application-level control deficiencies (continued) 
“The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures to test three controls over the Allowance for 
Loan Losses (ALL) that it selected. These controls consisted of (1) a management committee's 
review of reports used in the ALL calculation, (2) the Chief Financial Officer's ("CFO") review of 
the ALL calculation, and (3) the issuer's Board of Director's review and approval of the ALL 
calculation. The Firm's procedures to test these controls were limited to (1) inquiring of certain 
of the control owners and (2) obtaining minutes of meetings and noting that the minutes had 
been approved. In addition, the Firm obtained a memorandum prepared by the CFO that 
described the methodology used in determining the ALL and the results of the application of 
that methodology. For each of the three controls, however, the Firm failed to ascertain and 
evaluate the nature of the review procedures that the control owners performed to assess the 
reasonableness of the ALL, including the criteria used by the control owners to identify matters 
for follow up and whether those matters were appropriately resolved. As a result, the Firm 
failed to determine whether the controls operated at a level of precision that would prevent or 
detect material misstatements. In addition, the Firm failed to identify and test any controls over 
the accuracy and completeness of certain reports used in the operation of the controls 
described above. (AS No. 5, paragraphs 39, 42, and 44)” (PCAOB; Grant Thornton 2016 report 
date, Issuer A) (2014 inspection year) 
 
“In this audit, the Firm failed in the following respects to obtain sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence to support its audit opinion on the effectiveness of ICFR. The Firm failed to perform 
sufficient procedures to test the operating effectiveness of review controls over the existence, 
completeness, and valuation of revenue and accounts receivable. Specifically, the Firm's 
procedures were limited to discussing the controls with the control owners and observing the 
review, without evaluating whether the controls operated at a level of precision that would 
prevent or detect material misstatements, including evaluating the criteria used to identify 
items for investigation and/or determining whether specific items that were investigated were 
resolved. (AS No. 5, paragraphs 44 and 45)” (PCAOB; RSM 2014 report date, Issuer C) (2013 
inspection year) 
 
“[T]he Firm failed in the following respects to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to 
support its audit opinion on the financial statements. […] For two business units, the Firm failed 
to perform sufficient procedures to test revenue. Specifically, the Firm failed to sufficiently test 
the accuracy and completeness of system-generated data and reports used in testing revenue 
and unbilled accounts receivable. The Firm's procedures to test controls over accuracy and 
completeness were limited to obtaining an understanding of the system, and testing program 
change management through inquiry. (AS No. 15, paragraph 10)” (PCAOB; RSM 2014 report 
date, Issuer A) (2013 inspection year) 
 
